E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Stark Burt, British, 1/17/17/17/17/18

By JK HARS, Date 5/12/17/17

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A check of the UN Security Council debates reveals that on October 23, the Cuban Delegate Garcia-Inchaustegui quoted a previous statement by Dorticos as follows:

"Were the United States able to give Cuba effective

guarantees and satisfactory proof concerning the integrity of Cuban territory, and were it to cease its subversive and counter-revolutionary activities against our people, then Cuba would not have to strengthen its defenses. Cuba would not even need an army, and all the resources that are used for this could be gratefully and happily invested in the economic and cultural development of the country. Were the United States able to give us proof, by word and deed, that it would not carry out aggression against our country, then, we declare solemnly before you here and now, our weapons would be unnecessary and our army redundant. We believe ourselves able to create beace." (S/PV 1022 page 46).

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Similar signals have also been given at the UN, and, 48 hours earlier, by the Soviet Ambassador to Indonesia.

Simultaneously with the above Khrushchev made a slightly different proposal in his latest letter. The operative paragraphs are as follows:

(1) The penultimate paragraph of Part III (Moscow's 1101)
"If assurances were given by the President and

the government of the United States that the USA itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet, this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the government of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization and would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then, too, the question of armaments would disappear,

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since, if there is no threat, then armaments are a burden for every people. Then, too, the question of the destruction, not only of the armaments which you call offensive, but of all other armaments as well, would look different."

(2) The second paragraph of Part IV:

"Let us therefore snow statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.

Significantly, and contrary to expectations, Khrushchev did not seek to link the Cuban issue with such matters as the Jupiters in Turkey and Italy.

Two other points must be kept in mind. The first is the fact that both the US and apparently the USSR have accepted the U Thant proposal that for a temporary period the USSR will keep its ships out of the quarantine areas and the US will not intercept ships outside of these areas.

The second is the President's statement of September 13 in which he laid down the following three conditions:

"If /1/ at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Capt Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this country, or /2/ if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or /3/ become an



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offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies."